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ABSTRACT 
Policing decisions, allocations and outcomes are determined by mapping historical crime data geo-
spatially using popular algorithms. In this extended abstract, we present early results from a mixed-
methods study of the practices, policies, and perceptions of algorithmic crime mapping in the city of 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. We investigate this diferential by visualizing potential demographic biases 
from publicly available crime data over 12 years (2005-2016) and conducting semi-structured interviews 
of 19 city stakeholders and provide future research directions from this study. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Euclidean and Ge-
odesic k-means clustering for Motor Vehi-
cle Thef for February 2008 
Figure 2: Comparison of Euclidean and 
Geodesic k-means clustering for Thef for 
February 2008 
INTRODUCTION 
Algorithms have become pervasive [11] in most facets of daily living. Recognizing the growing 
importance of algorithmic transparency debate, HCI/CSCW researchers have slowly started crafing 
a broad research agenda in this area including thinking about how data analysts engage in the act of 
analyzing data[13] and how experts, non-experts and subjects perceive data[1] to support such goals. 
One of the most common applications of algorithms [4, 14] is in the area of crime analysis. Crime 
analysis focuses on crime mapping, prediction and forecasting. Results are usually used to develop 
administrative policies that allocate policing resources to particular geographical areas or to focus on 
specific crimes. What efect could the combination of algorithmic opacity and knowledge have on the 
ethical mapping of crime as crime analysts grapple and interact with ever increasing and complex 
forms of data? Our research project is atempting to understand such practices and their potentially 
unanticipated future consequences through a human-centered lens. 
In this extended abstract, we present some initial findings of our mixed methods study of the 
perceptions, practices and policies of algorithmic crime mapping in the city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
We investigated publicly available crime data over a period of 12 years (2005-2016) and conduct a semi-
structured interview study of 19 professional crime analysts and city stakeholders. Combining our 
methodological approaches, our initial exploration of the study suggests some theoretical implications 
such as default behaviors analysis among crime analysts. 
DEFAULT SETTINGS IN ALGORITHMS 
A default refers to predetermined parameters or setings that are being fixed by a computer program 
when a parameters or seting is not specified by the program user [15]. Past work has found that 
default policies can have a profound impact on users’ final policies and their overall use of a system. 
For example, users tend not to change default calendar sharing setings [12], online social network 
privacy setings [2, 6, 9, 16], and even organ donation choices[8]. 
Clearly, how policymakers select the default has important implications. Policymakers ofen have 
to decide which of the available options to impose on individuals who fail to make a decision [3] as 
people perceive the default as indicating the recommended course of action. It is very important for 
the policymakers to be aware of the implied messages conveyed by their choice of default as the user 
might rationally decide to stick with this default if he or she adequately trusts the system [10]. 
METHODS 
We started by interviewing two professional crime analysts to get an initial insights into algorithmic 
crime mapping practices. We used publicly available crime data about the city of Milwaukee for 
12 years (2005-2016) as an empirical lens of investigation. We focused on the ’k-means’ algorithm 
207
ALGORITHM 1: Potential Bias Index 
Input: G: geodesic cluster 
Input: E: list of unique euclidean clusters in G 
Output: I : Potential Bias Index 
numGeodesicPoints +- getPointCount(G) 
minorityRatio +- getMinorityRatio(G) 
clusterScore +- 0 
// for each euclidean cluster found in G 
foreach e; E E do 
I I for each point in geodesic cluster 
euclideanPoints +- 0 
matches+- 0 
foreach pj E e; do 
// if euclidean point is in geodesic cluster 
if pj E G then 
I matches +- matches + l 
end 
numEuclideanPoints +- numEuclideanPoints + I 
end 
score +- matches/ numEuclideanPoints 
weight +- matches/ numGeodesicPoints 
index +- score * weight 
clusterScore +- clusterScore + index 
end 
dissimilarity +- 1 - clusterScore 
potentialBiaslndex +- dissimilarity • minorityRatio 
return potentialBiaslndex 
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Figure 3: A histogram showing potential 
bias index (PBI) frequency 
Figure 4: potential bias index (PBI) aver-
ages for each month for 2, 5 and 10 clus-
ters 
Figure 5: Potential Bias Index Algorithm 
because its’ flaws are intuitive to understand for the layperson. We restricted our analysis to four 
common crimes: robbery, simple assault, thef and and motor vehicle thef that are commonly mapped 
by analysts. We created visualizations of potential bias and used publicly available demographic 
information to create a Potential Bias Index (PBI) (Fig 5.) that we used as visual aids in the next round 
of interviews. 
Then, we conducted follow-up interviews of 17 people. Eleven of them were professional crime 
analysts also working in the greater Milwaukee and Chicago metropolitan area. Six participants were 
local community organizers working to improve opportunities and reduce crime in the inner city. We 
adopted a grounded theory perspective [5] to our work. Afer multiple iteration of thematic analysis, 
initial high level themes have been emerged from the qualitative data. 
INITIAL RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Deconstructing k-means for potential biases 
Examining Lloyd’s algorithm for k-means, we found two inflection points for potential human bias 
[7] i.e. (a) the initial selection of clusters and (b) the choice of the distance metric. Considering (a) 
(Fig. 3), in practice, values for both thef and motor vehicle thef ranged from 0 to a high of 0.36. The 
average potential bias for a given k ranged between 0.069 and 0.17 for thef and between 0.063 and 
0.1706 for motor vehicle thef. In general, values of k greater than 4 produced an average bias value 
greater than or equal to .14, while values of k less than 4 produced values less than 0.1. 
For thef, the gold standard of 5 clusters produced a low potential bias value of 0.0315 and a high 
value of 0.3099 with a mean of 0.1442 and standard deviation of 0.0562. Motor Vehicle Thef had a 
larger range with a low of 0.0180, a high 0.3495, a mean of 0.1457, and a standard deviation 0.0665.Thef 
exhibited lower standard deviation than motor vehicle thef, likely due to the higher number of data 
points (900 vs 400). But between both, when high potential bias values are produced, the associated 
clusterings typically featured two diferent configurations of the city center, while the clusters in the 
northern and southern ends of the city tended to be similar. This is likely due to the sparser nature of 
points on the city periphery, while the density of points toward the center of the city created more 
"unstable" initializations that result in high potential bias scores. 
Considering (b) and looking at a given geodesic cluster, dissimilarity can increase in two ways. First, 
dissimilarity will increase when the number of unique euclidean clusters present increases. Geodesic 
cluster purity will decrease dissimilarity. Second, dissimilarity will increase if a small ratio of euclidean 
points are found inside the geodesic cluster compared to the number of points in the euclidean cluster. 
This dissimilarity score can be between 0 and 1. Zero means a geodesic cluster matches perfectly with 
a euclidean cluster. If a geodesic cluster contains small fractions of many diferent euclidean clusters, 
its score will approach 1. A visualization of this efect is presented in Figure 1 and 2. 
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"I didn’t know what these distance things 
[metrics] are...I understand the Euclidean 
that...the calculation of the straight line 
because we learnt it in high school but I 
didn’t know that there were other ways to 
calculate distance. I just point and click [on 
the GUI based crime analysis sofware that 
they use developed by a private third 
party]"- Jill (28, female, crime analyst) 
"When I go to run the clusters [referring to 
k-means or other clustering methods], there 
are many other options on the menu but I 
don’t know most of them so I just go with 
the default options on the menu... we were 
taught a basic idea of clustering but I didn’t 
know that we could have so many diferent 
options. - John (37, male, crime analyst)" 
"When I started the job, I was told that we 
always divide the city into five main 
divisions. There is the downtown cluster, the 
northshore cluster where all the rich folks 
live...you have the northwestern and 
southside clusters where there is a lot of 
gang activity and then the west side near 
the suburbs where a lot of people commute 
from." - Kevin (29,male,crime analyst) 
"I am not sure how this [k-means 
algorithm] works. In school, we were always 
taught to think about applying the right 
tool for the right job but we weren’t taught 
much about what’s under the hood ...we 
were told that it [k-means] works very well 
for spatial data but we didn’t learn much 
else." - Mathew (34, male, crime analyst) 
Default behavior of Crime analysts 
One of the main findings from our interviews is that, on the whole, crime analysts were unclear 
about the theoretical design and inner workings of the algorithms that they were using. Decisions 
made during data analysis were mostly supplemented with prior knowledge and existing mental 
models of the city. 
All our analyst interviewees had masters degrees in criminology, crime analysis, sociology or public 
administration and had taken a few courses in applied statistics like Mathew. Some participants 
reported complete unfamiliarity with statistical distance metrics afer we explained how k-means 
worked and displayed our visualizations like Jill.In this case, Jill does not change the default distance 
metric (Euclidean) that is provided in the sofware even though other options are present. Others 
point to a lack of transparency and clarity within the choices provided by the sofware that they 
use and a confusion in selecting appropriate options. This leads them to select default options. For 
instance, what John said in the given quote. 
This refers to a general lack of transparency in how this third party sofware designs and implements 
the algorithms. When faced with a variegated menu of choices, the analysts select the one that is most 
familiar i.e. the default option. Taken together, this type of analysis is rule-based and path-bound[13]. 
It is natural to be paralyzed by a suite of potential options and then choose the most familiar one, 
however incorrect it might be under the given circumstances. However, when asked about how they 
decide to select the initial number of clusters, some participants responded that they depended on 
existing institutional knowledge about crime in Milwaukee. For instance, when asked about city-level 
clustering, Kevin referred to extant institutional knowledge that is in all likelihood, already biased. 
Any subsequent analysis depends on this initial categorization that is dependent on institutional 
knowledge. Therefore, this type of analysis is based on situated decision making[13]. We observe here 
that while domain knowledge is very important, when combined together with what we learnt about 
the statistical (in)appropriateness of the actual process, there is a lot of potential for mis-classification 
and untoward policy making. Relatively few people request to switch from the default regardless of 
what the default is. Clearly, the default selected by policymakers has important implications. 
CONCLUSION 
We presented an exploratory analysis of the ways in which opacity and bias afects professional 
crime analysis by focusing on the practices, policies and perceptions around crime in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. We used publicly available data over a 12 year period (2005-2016) as well as interviews of 
19 stakeholders (professional crime analysts and community organizers) to make our case. Moreover, 
our efort in involving multiple stakeholders to understand this issue is showed to be very illuminating 
especially in understanding practices of police departments around crime analysis. 
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